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The Limits of Saving
PAMELA PERUNt

Like Rip Van Winkle, baby boomers have awoken to
find that they have aged. Their retirement is looming, and
now it seems that everyone is worried about saving for it.
The popular press, with the assistance of the financial
services industry, has made saving for retirement a trendy
topic. Financial planning advice and products devoted to
retirement savings fill the daily newspaper, the media, and
even the Internet.
When concerns over retirement income arise, we
usually look to the private pension system for solutions.!
Recently, Congress has been considering a set of proposals
that increase the amount people can save through the
private pension system by raising limits on contributions to
defined contribution plans. The current limits have not
been raised in several years. In fact, in many respects, they
are much lower than they were in the early 1980s. These
reform proposals would largely restore previous limits,
reversing a twenty-year trend of restricting pension
contributions in order to reduce federal budget deficits and
distribute tax benefits more evenly.

t Consultant to the Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. This research was
supported by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation to the
Retirement Project of the Urban Institute. The views expressed in this article
are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its
trustees, or its funders. This article was originally published as PA=ELA PERUN,
THE Lirms OF SAVING, (Urban Inst., The Retirement Project, Occasional Paper
No. 7, 2000), copyright © 2000 Urban Institute. The author wishes to thank
Steven E. Stoft for his extraordinary efforts in creating the model used in this
article and Rudolph G. Penner and C. Eugene Steuerle for their helpful
comments on the analysis and prior versions of this article.
1. The term "private pension system" as used in this article includes all
arrangements to produce retirement income authorized by the Internal
Revenue Code, such as qualified plans, tax-sheltered annuities, plans based on
individual retirement accounts, individual retirement accounts, and other
deferred compensation arrangements. It does not include equity-based plans or
arrangements such as stock option or stock purchase plans.
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Many view these proposals as a means, in an era of
budget surpluses, of reclaiming the private pension
system's intended status. Raising contribution limits may
also be an appropriate response to employers' growing belief
that employees must assume more responsibility for their
retirement income. Many employers, for example, have
reduced their own contributions to defined contribution
plans or terminated defined benefit plans, leaving employee
savings to fill the gap. Others have shifted from outright
contributions to matching contributions. But proposals to
raise contribution limits are highly controversial. Although
some people feel that the long-overdue changes will restore
the pension system's ability to generate adequate
retirement income after years of cutbacks and restrictions,
others think the changes will provide extra tax benefits to
wealthy Americans without substantially raising overall
retirement savings.!
How might raising the limits on contributions to
defined contribution plans affect individual retirement
savings through the private pension system? Using a model
of hypothetical lifetime savings, this article analyzes the
reform proposals for a sample of defined contribution plans
that permit individuals to choose how much to save for
retirement every year.
The article argues that the reforms would do little to
change the savings status quo in the private pension
system. Any positive effect is found primarily among
higher-income individuals and individuals who can afford
extremely high savings rates under the raised limits. Some
negative effects-perhaps due to model assumptions-are
found among lower-income individuals who try to save at a
high rate. Current contribution limits comfortably

2. See PETER R. ORSZAG ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
PROPOSED PENSION CHANGES WOULD OVERWHELMINGLY BENEFIT CORPORATE
EXECUTIVES AND OwNERS 1 (2000); PETER R. ORSZAG ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, EXACERBATING INEQUITIES IN PENSION BENEFITS: AN

ANALYSIS OF THE PENSION PROVISIONS IN THE TAX BILL 2 (1999), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/10-8-99taxhtm; CrrizENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, SENATE GOP
MINIMUM WAGE HIKE PROVIDES $75 BILLION IN UPPER-INCOME TAX BREAKS (Nov.
8, 1999), available at http:/vww.cbpp.org/html/mwsen.htm; IRIS J. LAV, CENTER
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, NICKLES MINIMUIM WAGE BILL INCLUDES
COSTLY TAX CUTS THAT COULD HARi LOWER-WAGE WORKERS 1-2 (1999),
available at http://wvw.cbpp.org/1I-8-99tax.htm.
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accommodate more plausible savings rates for all income
levels.
Consequently, the primary effect of the proposals is to
enable higher-income individuals who would like-and can
afford-to save more for retirement to do so with more
federal tax dollars. The proposals do little to provide extra
incentive to those who can afford to save more but do not.
Nor do they provide additional benefits to those who can
afford to save only a little or nothing at all. As a result,
more constructive reforms of the private pension system,
with greater potential to increase saving, are warranted.
Ideally, such reforms would rationalize the number and
types of plans available and help those left behind by
today's private pension system.
I.

THE STUDY

Evaluating reform proposals to the private pension
system is a difficult task.' The complex system has many
plan types, sources of funding, intricate rules, and special
exceptions. In addition, the savings decisions that people
make, regardless of their purpose, are not well understood.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to test the reform proposals
using a very simplified model of the private pension system.
Because these proposals are designed to enable individuals
to save more for retirement, this article focuses exclusively
on each proposal's effect on plans permitting individuals to
decide how much to save for retirement each year. For each
plan, it compares hypothetical lifetime savings under
current law (before reform) and proposed law for two
different groups: those who save the maximum amount
allowed each year ("maximizers") and those who save 5% of
their pretax income each year ("steady savers").
This study does not attempt to analyze how much
people should, or do, save for retirement. Nor does it assess
3. There are many variations of the reform proposals analyzed here. Several
were included in the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, H.R. 2488, 106th
Cong., which was vetoed by President Clinton last fall, and were subsequently
reintroduced in other bills in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
This model analyzes mainly the proposals that were referred to the House Ways
and Means Committee in October 1999 as part of the Wage and Employment
Growth Act of 1999. H.R. 3081, 106th Cong. There are no substantial
differences across the various proposals now under consideration, and the
model represents a fair cross-section of all the current proposals.
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the impact of these proposals on increasing society's overall
savings (which may be an independent policy goal). Even if
there were an empirical basis for such analyses-none
currently exists-this study has a different focus. It
examines how much people could save in a lifetime, given
certain propensities to save, and looks at limits in the
current tax code versus those in the reform proposals. This
analysis is solely concerned with savings and associated tax
subsidies within a subset of private pension system plans; it
does not take employer contributions or participation in
multiple plans into account. In addition, no attempt is made
to estimate or analyze the effects of savings in other
forms-home ownership, equity investments, and rental
income or similar sources-on income in retirement.
A. The Retirement Plans
The sample plans are all defined contribution plans.
They include 401(k)s, 403(b)s, and 457s for employees;
individual retirement accounts (IRAs) for employees whose
employers do not have plans; and Simplified Employee
Pensions (SEPs) and money purchase plans (MPPs) for selfemployed individuals
The core set of plans-401(k), 403(b) and 457 plansexplicitly permit employees to decide (within tax code
limits) how much to save for retirement every year, a
relatively new feature in the private pension plan system.
IRAs provide a similar savings arrangement. Self-employed
individuals are included in the analysis because they have
similarly flexible savings choices with MPPs, which are the
most generous defined contribution plans, and SEPs, which
are less generous but more popular.
B. The ContributionLimits
Table 1 describes the relevant limits on contributions
for each sample plan under both current law and the
proposed changes. Although each plan involves many
limits, there are essentially three to keep in mind. The first,
under I.R.C. § 401(a)(17), limits the amount of
compensation that can be used to calculate contributions.'
4. See Appendix infra for brief histories and descriptions of each plan.
5. Limits are adjusted for inflation.
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Table 1. Comparison of Relevant Limits
Special Rules
Compensation
Contribution
Limits
Limits
Contribution deductible if
Compensation
Lesser of $2000 or
no employer plan; if
compensation
covered by a plan,
contribution phased out
between $32,000-$42,000
in income for single and
$52,000-$62,000 for
married individuals

401(k)
Current
Law
Proposed
Law

Lesser of $10,500 or
25% of compensation

$170,000

Lesser of $15,000 (by
2005) or 100% of
compensation

$200,000 (in 2001)

Average contributions by
the highly paid limited to
125% of the average
percent contributed by the
or
paid,
non-highly
whichever is lower: twice
the percentage contributed
by the non-highly paid or
that percentage plus 2

403(b)
Current
Law

Proposed
Law

Least of $10,500, 25%
of compensation, or
Maximum Exclusion
Allowance (MEA)
(20% of compensation
times years of service
minus prior
contributions)
Lesser of $15,000 (by
2005) or 100% of

$170,000

N/A

$200,000 (in 2001)

compensation

457
Current
Law
Proposed
Law

Lesser of $8000 or
25% of compensation
Lesser of $15,000 (by
2005) or 50% of

None
None

Contributions calculated
on the basis of
compensation minus
contributions

compensation

SEP
Current
Law
Proposed
Law
MPP
Current
Law
Proposed
Law

Lesser of $30,000 or
13% of compensation

$170,000

Overall 15 % deductible
limit on all contributions

Lesser of $40,000 (by
2005) or 13% of
compensation

$200,000 (in 2001)

For self-employed,
contributions calculated on
the basis of gross earnings
minus contributions

Lesser of $30,000 or
20% of compensation
Lesser of $40,000 (by
2005) or 50% of

$170,000

For self-employed,
contributions calculated on
the basis of gross earnings
minus contributions

compensation

$200,000 (in 2001)
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Where it applies, this limit for year 2000 is $170,000. The
second, under I.R.C. § 415(c)(1), limits the amount that can
be contributed to an individual account each year; where
applicable, this limit is currently $30,000 or 25% of what a
worker is paid (whichever is lower) and generally includes
contributions from both employers and employees. The
third, under I.R.C. §§ 402(g) and 457(b)(2), limits the
amount that an individual can contribute to a 401(k),
403(b), or 457 plan. In year 2000, this limit is $10,500 for
401(k) plans and 403(b) plans and $8000 for 457 plans.
Among the plans, 457s are simpler than either 401(k)s
or 403(b)s. Under current law, each employee can
contribute a fixed amount-in year 2000, the lower of $8000
or 25%6 of his or her salary-to a 457 plan. Both 401(k)s
and 403(b)s are more complex. Special rules are designed to
encourage low-paid employees to participate in 401(k)s.
Under a 401(k) plan, the amount that highly paid
employees (generally those earning at least $85,000 a year)
can contribute as a group depends on how much low-paid
employees contribute as a group. Rules governing 401(k)
plans also restrict an employee's annual individual
contributions to whichever is lower: a fixed amount
($10,500 in year 2000) or 25% of his or her compensation.
While low-paid employees always have the option to
contribute as much as they wish under this annual limit,
highly paid employees may not be able to contribute as
much as they wish if low-paid employees contribute too
little to the plan.
The most complicated of the three plans are 403(b)s.
They have the same annual individual contribution limit as
401(k) plans, but they also have an additional limit called a
maximum exclusion allowance (MEA). In contrast to
401(k)s, which focus on contribution differentials between
low-paid and highly paid employees, the MEA sets an
individual cumulative ceiling on contributions; the ceiling
must be tested annually.
Like 457s, IRAs are simple plans. Any individual
without a plan at work can contribute up to $2,000 a year
on a pretax basis. For self-employed individuals, SEPs and
MPPs are relatively simple arrangements-provided, as is
6. According to the statute, the limit is actually one-third of compensation,
but compensation is determined after subtracting contributions to the plan.
Therefore, in effect, the limit is reduced to 25% of compensation.

2001]

THE LIMITS OF SAVING

879

assumed in this study, there are no other employees. As a
general rule, an MPP permits a self-employed person with
no employees to contribute whichever is smaller: $30,000 or
25% of his or her earnings. A self-employed person with no
employees who is saving through a SEP is limited to an
annual contribution of whichever is lower: $30,000 or 15%
of his or her compensation. It is important to note that the
"earned income" of self-employed individuals is computed
including items such as plan contributions, and that onehalf of self-employment taxes paid from gross earnings are
deducted. This calculation essentially reduces the
compensation limit to 20% for a MPP and 13% for a SEP.
The reform proposals would make the following
changes:7 (1) standardize the contribution limits in 401(k),
403(b), and 457 plans; (2) raise the cap on compensation
from $170,000 to $200,000; (3) over a five year period, raise
the dollar limit for contributions by employees in 401(k),
403(b), and 457 plans to $15,000; (4) raise the compensation
limit from 25% to 100%; and (5) raise the limit on annual
individual contributions from $30,000 to $40,000.
C. The Model
The model used in this study creates hypothetical
patterns of retirement contributions, earnings, and
distributions for six identical individuals, each of whom
saves for retirement under only one of the six sample plans.
For this article, the model analyzes two types of savers:
maximizers (who save the maximum amount permitted
under each plan each year) and steady savers (who save 5%
of before-tax compensation each year).
Each individual is assumed to begin saving in 2001, the
year he or she turns thirty-five. In order to simplify the

7. This article analyzes only the standard formula for contributions under
each plan. The current law provides "catch-up" elections, which enable certain
older employees to contribute additional amounts. See I.R.C. § 457 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997); I.R.C. § 403(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) amended by Pub. L. No.
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). Certain types of employees are eligible for
alternative contribution elections through § 403(b) plans. The reform proposals
would eliminate the special § 403(b) elections, change the § 457 catch-up, and
provide new, identical catch-up elections for individuals over fifty in 401(k),
403(b), and 457 plans. Because of the complexity of the relevant rules, this
article does not examine the effect of these alternative contribution formulas
under either current or proposed law.
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analysis as much as possible, the model assumes that
individuals save for retirement exclusively through the
private pension system and through one type of plan during
their work lives. To compute the value of a given plan and
its tax benefits, the model also includes a control (a twin)
who has no retirement plan. The model calculates the
savings of the twin using the assumption that both twins
are equally well-off in their pre-retirement years. That is,
they both have the same "disposable income" after paying
taxes and saving for retirement. For example, assume that
one individual and his or her twin each have $40,000 in
income in year one. The individual with a plan pays $6298
in income taxes after saving $2000 in his or her plan,
leaving a disposable income of $31,702. The twin without a
plan pays $6858 in income taxes and saves $1440, also
leaving a disposable income of $31,702. Each individual
(and his or her twin) continues to save in this way until
reaching age sixty-five in 2031 and retiring. Distributions
begin in the first year of retirement and continue for ten
years.
Contributions are assumed to be invested 60% in
equities (with a 7% real rate of return and a 9.4% nominal
rate of return) and 40% in bonds (with a 3% real rate of
return and a 5.4% nominal rate of return). Discount rates
used in the study to calculate present values are a weighted
average of these real rates of return. Twins are assumed to
realize 30% of the equity portion of their portfolios each
year, even in retirement. They pay capital gains taxes on
realized amounts and reinvest the remainder in equities.
Interest on the bond portion of their portfolios is taxed at
ordinary income tax rates with the remainder reinvested in
bonds. These parameters are fixed throughout each
individual's life. For individual tax calculations, it is
assumed that individuals are single and take the standard
deduction each year. This, along with their earnings and
their contributions to a plan, determines taxable income
and thus their relevant tax bracket (i.e., marginal tax rate).
Tax rates are assumed to remain consistent with current
law, and tax brackets are adjusted annually for inflation
under current rules. An annual increase in inflation of 2.4%
is also assumed. Contribution, compensation, and other
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limits under each plan are adjusted for inflation as
prescribed under current law. 8
D. The Graphs
The horizontal axis of each graph indicates
compensation, defined as the level of income earned in 2001
(the initial year of savings) when each individual is thirtyfive. In the discussion below, it is important to remember
that the term "income" actually refers to income in the
initial year of saving. All income profiles (rich and poor) are
proportional so income in the initial year of saving is
indicative of the individual's lifetime compensation level.
For example, an individual with $40,000 in initial income is
twice as rich (in terms of income) as an individual with
$20,000 in initial income in the first year of saving and
remains twice as rich every year thereafter.
are
For each of the six plans, individuals
simultaneously plotted across twenty-four income levels,
beginning with the lowest-paid person (initial income of
$10,000) and ending with an extremely highly paid person
(initial income of $240,000). This income range covers three
broad groups: individuals who are highly paid throughout
their lifetimes, individuals who are never highly paid, and
individuals who may or may not be highly paid in any given
year.9 Data points are presented in increments of $10,000,
beginning at $10,000 and ending at $240,000. This model
assumes that each individual has a 1% real increase in
earnings over his or her lifetime, with a real income peak at
age fifty. Each graph plots the six plans individually.

8. Under these assumptions, the world during the next forty years looks
very much like it does today. No claim is made for their predictive ability.
Income tax rates, rates of return, and inflation rates, for example, have varied
widely in the past and are expected to do so in the future. Any major changes in
such rates could change the results of the analysis substantially. These
assumptions are merely intended to hold important variables to predictable
changes as much as possible in order to make the effects of the reform proposals
more apparent.
9. Pension law has no single standard for determining who is highly paid.
One measure for 401(k) plans, is currently $85,000 a year in income as a cut-off
point for some nondiscrimination testing purposes. I.R.C. § 414(q) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). There is also an inferred measure that uses $170,000 (in 2000)
as the compensation cut-off point for calculating contributions under most
plans. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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1. Contributions. The model computes two savings
patterns, one for current law and another for the reform
proposals, and then calculates the changes caused by the
proposals. Current law is illustrated in the "before reform"
graphs. The graphs labeled "changes" show the difference in
lifetime savings due to the reform proposals, assuming that
reforms are implemented.
2. Subsidies. The graphs illustrate the subsidies
available to maximizers and steady savers before reform as
well as the difference as a result of reform. Saving through
the private pension system can provide substantial tax
subsidies not available through other means of savings. The
tax code provides three special provisions: plan
contributions are made with pretax dollars, earnings on
those contributions accumulate on a tax-free basis, and no
taxes are paid on retirement benefits until payments are
actually received. The first subsidy derives from the
interplay between tax rates at the time of contribution and
distribution: the greater the differential in tax rates, the
greater the tax subsidy. In most situations, people will be in
lower tax brackets during retirement than during their
work lives. If so, they will save on taxes because their
benefits will ultimately be taxed at lower rates. The second
subsidy exists because taxes on contributions and earnings
are deferred until benefits are distributed from the plan.
This can provide an even more substantial tax benefit. The
graphs consider the effect of the reform proposals on tax
subsidies expressed as follows: total real subsidies, average
percentage subsidies, and marginal subsidies.
II. CASE ONE: MAXIMIZERS
The analysis first examines the effects of increasing
contribution limits by considering the most extreme savings
profile, those belonging to maximizers. The following
graphs illustrate the maximum total lifetime contributions
and maximum value of various tax subsidies available
through each plan under current law and after changes due
to reform proposals. It is important to remember that
although maximizers contribute the maximum amount
deductible for tax purposes each year, theirs is not
necessarily the optimal savings pattern for all individuals
at all times.
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A. Contributions
As the analysis below indicates, there are instances
when some maximizers would actually be better off
contributing less. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the maximum
total contributions (in 2001 dollars) associated with each
plan.
Figure 1:
Maximizers' Lifetime Savings Before Reform
$1,200,000
$1,000,000
s~oo~oo

-4-IRA
-USEP
P

600,000

-457
A 403b
-401k

$400,000
$200,000

$0

$40

$80
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$160

$200

$240

Initial Income (in Thousands)

1. Before Reform. In Figure 1, the plans can be
grouped into three levels: (1) IRAs; (2) 457s, 403(b)s, and
401(k)s; and (3) SEPs and MPPs. IRAs provide maximizers
with the most limited ability to save for retirement. After
thirty years of saving, the majority of maximizers have
contributed only about $44,000, taking inflation into
account, toward their retirement. Discounting this $44,000
by the real rate of return gives a present value of about
$25,000. When earnings on those contributions are taken
into account, most maximizers with IRAs have
accumulations of about $125,000 in real dollars at age
sixty-five. On the other hand, SEPs and MPPs provide selfemployed maximizers with the greatest ability to save. The
amount these maximizers can contribute increases up to
$160,000 in income, at which point compensation limits
curb contributions. The most maximizers can contribute is
about $700,000 through a SEP and about $1,000,000
through a MPP ($350,000 and $525,000, respectively, in
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present value). When earnings are taken into consideration,
maximizers with SEPs and MPPs and $10,000 in initial
income have account accumulations at age sixty-five of
about $100,000 and $170,000, respectively. Maximizers
with these plans at initial income levels of $160,000 and
greater have account accumulations of $1.7 million and $2.6
million, respectively.
Contributions for maximizers with 401(k), 403(b), or
457 plans also flatten out, but at the much lower level of
roughly $40,000 in initial income. At these income levels,
the 25% of compensation limit restricts contributions to less
than the flat dollar limit ($10,500 for 403(b) and 401(k)
plans and $8000 for 457 plans). At higher income levels, the
flat dollar limit effectively restricts contributions. A third
limit, applicable only to 401(k) plans, restricts contributions
by maximizers in the $70,000 to $120,000 initial income
range.' ° Maximum lifetime contributions by retirement are
about $320,000 (401(k) plans), $330,000 (403(b) plans), and
$260,000 (457 plans). The present value of those
contributions is about $160,000, $170,000 and $130,000,
respectively. Account accumulations at age sixty-five in real
terms are about $820,000, $844,000 and $670,000.
2. Reform Results. The primary effect of the reform
proposals is to make MPP, the most generous plan, even
more generous. Even the poorest maximizers with MPPs,
those earning $10,000 in initial income, can increase their
lifetime contributions by about $100,000. Largely because
they can increase contributions to 50% of income (up to a
maximum of $40,000), those in the income range of $30,000
10. Under these special rules, the amount highly paid individuals
(generally, over $85,000 in income ) as a group can contribute depends on how
much low-paid individuals contribute as a group. To calculate contributions to
401(k) plans, assumptions have to be made about low-paid employees
contribution rates. This model assumes that they save, on average, 4%
annually. This restricts the contributions of highly paid employees to 4% plus
the differential permitted by law. Prior analysis indicates that if the low-paid
contribute 10% or more as a group, highly paid contributions are not restricted.
But that was felt to be an unreasonably high figure. For simplicity's sake, these
calculations assume that no highly paid person can contribute more than the
average amount contributed by the low-paid plus the differential permitted by
law. In an actual 401(k) plan with many participants, the amount contributed
by the highly paid must be within legal limits on a group basis only. So not all
highly paid individuals are held to the group average. This model therefore
overstates somewhat the effect of these restrictions on highly paid individuals.
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to $150,000 can contribute substantially more. Those with

initial incomes of $80,000 benefit the most and can increase
their lifetime contributions by about $700,000. Account
accumulations at retirement for all maximizers who earn
$80,000 are about $3.1 million, an increase of at least 80%.
Maximizers with SEPs are not so fortunate. They benefit
only from the increase in the plan compensation limit from
$170,000 to $200,000. Those formerly affected by that limit
increase their lifetime contributions by about $100,000. The
reform proposals make no change to IRAs, the least
generous plan.
Figure 2:
Changes in Maximizers' Lifetime Savings
Due to Reform
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A secondary effect of the reform proposals is to make
401(k), 403(b), and 457 plans far more uniform. First, the
maximum exclusion allowance, effective only for 403(b)
plans, and the 25%-of-compensation limit (for all but 457
plans) no longer apply. This primarily benefits low-paid
individuals (those earning less than $40,000 in initial
income). For example, maximizers at the $10,000 initial
income level benefit the most, since they can contribute
roughly an additional $80,000 to a 457 plan and $250,000 to
a 403(b) plan or 401(k) plan. Second, the same contribution
cap-increased substantially to $15,000 annually-applies
to all three plans.
Maximizers with 457 plans benefit the most, largely
because their dollar contribution limit almost doubles; the

886

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

other two plans experience about a 50% increase in the
limit. Maximizers with 457 plans and incomes above
$40,000 increase their contributions by about $150,000;
those with 403(b) plans contribute only about an additional
$80,000. Because of the special 401(k) nondiscrimination
rules," maximizers with 401(k) plans and incomes between
$80,000 and $140,000 do not participate in these increases.
They are considered to be highly paid employees, and their
contributions are subject to the additional limit of the
amount contributed on average by low-paid employees
(assumed in this model to be 4%) plus the differential
ermitted by law. But those with initial income levels below
70,000 are on a par with maximizers with 403(b) plans.
When account accumulations are considered, a variety of
maximizers-those with 457 plans and incomes over
$30,000, 403(b) plans and incomes over $10,000, or 401(k)
plans and incomes between $20,000 and $80,000-end up
with the same amount, about $1 million (roughly three to
four times their accumulations under current law). These
are
substantial
increases,
but their maximum
accumulations are still only one-third to one-half of those
possible with an SEP or MPP.
B. Total Real Subsidies
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the amount of real after-tax
dollars that maximizers receive as a tax subsidy through
participation in the private pension system in comparison
with their twins who have no plan. More explicitly, these
figures show the difference in tax dollars paid on retirement
accumulations by two identical individuals, one who saves
through the private pension system and receives its special
tax subsidies and one who saves through more conventional
means, such as a brokerage or savings account, and pays
taxes on those savings every year under standard tax rules.
The figures indicate how many more dollars the individuals
in each plan at each income level have available to spend in
retirement compared to their twins.
1. Before Reform. Figure 3 illustrates the general
relationship between contributions
and subsidies.
Generally, individuals who contribute more receive a larger
11. See supra note 10.
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subsidy. However, this does not necessarily mean that the
richest contributors receive the greatest dollar amount. For
example, an individual with $170,000 in initial income
would receive a subsidy of about $40,000 from an IRA,
$420,000 from a SEP, $570,000 from an MPP, $185,000
from a 457 plan, $225,000 from a 403(b) plan and $220,000
from a 401(k) plan. Comparable subsidy figures for an
individual with an initial income of $240,000 are $35,000,
$400,000, $550,000, $175,000, $210,000, and $205,000
respectively.
Figure 3:

Maximizers' Total Real Subsidy
Before Reform
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Due to the interaction of plan limits on contributions,
the greatest subsidies accrue to those in the more generous
plans and to whom those plans are most generous. For
example, maximizers with SEPs or MPPs, the most
generous plans, generally receive the greatest subsidies.
People saving through SEPs receive subsidies that range
from a low of about $17,000 (if their initial income is
$10,000) to a high of about $400,000 (if their initial income
is over $160,000). Comparable amounts for those with
MPPs are a low of about $24,000 to a high of around
$560,000. The experience of maximizers with IRAs further
illustrates this relationship. Their contributions are a
uniform dollar amount, independent of income, and their
subsidies are almost uniform as well. All maximizers with
IRAs in income levels over $30,000 receive about $40,000 in
subsidy. Maximizers with 457, 403(b), and 401(k) plans
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receive very similar subsidies because their plan limits are
very similar. However, because 401(k) plans are often less
enerous to those at income levels between $80,000 and
120,000, subsidies for these maximizers lag behind those
of their peers with other plans.
Figure 3 also illustrates the general relationship
between tax brackets and tax subsidies. The amount the
federal government forgoes in taxes on retirement plan
savings depends on the differential in tax rates during
employment and in retirement. Even if individuals are in
the same tax bracket during retirement, individuals in
higher tax brackets during employment will receive larger
dollar subsidies on their savings because the government
forgives more in taxes. Figure 3, for example, indicates that
subsidies for all maximizers show a pronounced increase at
about $40,000 in initial income. They increase by about onethird for IRAs, double for SEPs, and at least triple for all
other plans. A second but less pronounced increase occurs
at around $110,000 to $130,000 in initial income. This
increase is most apparent in SEPs, MPPs, 457 plans, and
403(b) plans, where subsidies increase by about 35% for
SEPs, 40% for MPPs, and about 25% for 457s and 403(b)s.
These increases occur close to bend points in tax brackets,
thus illustrating that individuals in higher tax brackets
receive greater subsidies than those who are relatively close
in income levels but in a lower tax bracket during
employment. The contributions made by these individuals
are similar, but the tax subsidy received often is not.
2. Reform Results. As Figure 4 indicates, the reform
proposals decrease the dollar subsidy received by many of
the poorest maximizers (for example, those with initial
income levels of $10,000 to $40,000.) Maximizers at these
income levels with IRAs and SEPs receive no additional
subsidies; those in the other plans actually receive negative
subsidies. Maximizers with 403(b) and 401(k) plans receive
about $85,000 less (a loss of about $55,000) if they have
$10,000 in initial income, and about $40,000 less (a loss of
about $18,000) if they have $20,000 in initial income. Under
current law, contributions by individuals are capped at
$10,500 or 25% of compensation, but the reform proposals
eliminate the 25% cap in most plans. As a result, most
maximizers contribute the flat dollar amount that, at these
income levels, comprises most of their taxable income, so
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they pay very little in tax during employment. In
retirement, however, they receive substantial distributions
that are taxed, often at high rates. They do not receive tax
benefits from the private pension system and might be
better off not participating at all. This illustrates that the
strategy for maximizing savings modeled in this article is
not the optimal strategy for these individuals. These
negative subsidies, however, may be attributable to the
assumed ten year distribution schedule. If maximizers took
distributions over a period of fifteen to twenty years, the
amount included in income every year would be smaller and
the negative subsidy might then diminish or disappear.

$200,000

Figure 4:
Changes in Maximizers' Total Real Subsidy
Due to Reform
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Other maximizers profit from the more generous
contribution limits. Again, those favored by the more
generous plans receive the greatest subsidy increase in
terms of dollars. Maximizers with MPPs and initial income
levels between roughly $110,000 and $130,000 are the
primary winners: They receive $100,000 to $150,000 in
additional subsidies. Maximizers with 457 plans also
generally do better than those with 403(b) or 401(k) plans
because they receive the greatest increase in contribution
limits. Maximizers with IRAs, of course, receive no
additional subsidy because their contribution limits are
unchanged. Maximizers with SEPs receive additional
subsidies-but only where the increased limit on

890

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

compensation takes effect at income levels above $160,000.
Their maximum additional subsidy amount is about

$50,000.
C. Average Subsidy Rates
Figures 5 and 6 examine a more relative measure of the
subsidies available to participants in the private pension
system. The vertical axis in both figures indicates the
percentage of retirement dollars received by individuals in
each plan (when compared with their twins whose
more
through
generated
are
dollars
retirement
or
savings
a
as
conventional means of saving, such
tax
benefits
to
the
brokerage account) that are attributable
of the private pension system.
1. Before Reform. Figure 5 illustrates two primary
effects. First, it is in many respects the inverse of Figures 1
and 3. Perhaps surprisingly, maximizers with IRAs, the
least generous plans, receive the highest average subsidies
at all income levels. Maximizers with MPPs, the most
generous plans, receive the smallest average subsidies at
all but the lowest income levels. This relationship reflects
an interaction between contribution differentials across the
plans and tax rate differentials. Individuals with IRAs, for
example, can only contribute $2000 each year. That amount
is unlikely to reduce their taxes substantially or to lower
their tax bracket during employment, allowing them to
receive the maximum available subsidy. Individuals in
other plans can make more substantial contributions, which
will lower their taxes and perhaps their tax brackets during
employment and therefore their ultimate tax subsidy.
Second, richer maximizers get a much higher average
subsidy rate than poorer maximizers, independent of plan
type. This effect occurs in all plans, although Figure 5
exhibits increases in subsidy rates (at the tax bracket bend
points) similar to those shown in Figure 3. For example,
maximizers with incomes below $40,000 generally receive
average subsidies below 20%, or twenty cents on the dollar.
Average subsidies (except for maximizers with IRAs) for
those with incomes between $40,000 and $130,000 are in
the mid-20% to mid-30% ranges, or about twenty-five to
thirty-five cents on the dollar; for those in the highest
income levels, average subsidies are in the mid-30% to mid-
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40% ranges, or about thirty-five to forty-five cents on the
dollar.
Figure 5:
Maximizers' Average Subsidy Rate
Before Reform
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In general, the differences between tax rates in
employment and retirement play the key role in producing
the tax subsidies available through the private pension
system. Differences in contribution amounts play a limited
role, primarily as a component in the tax bracket effect.
Tax deferral is also an important factor. If tax rates in
employment and retirement were the same, individuals
would still receive subsidized savings through the private
pension system. Those savings would be at a lower, but
more uniform, rate across income levels. For example,
individuals who make below $20,000 annually receive
average subsidy rates of about 15%, while those at higher
income levels receive between 30% and 36%. In addition,
differences based on contribution amounts disappear as
individuals within equivalent income levels receive the
same average subsidy rate, independent of plan types. The
only exceptions to this rule are maximizers with IRAs, who
still receive a slightly greater (by 1% to 2%) subsidy than
would be available under all other plans.
2. Reform Results. Figure 6 indicates that the reform
proposals either have no effect on or actually decrease the
average subsidy rate available to maximizers. The larger
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contributions permitted under the proposals decrease the
tax bracket effect and tax subsidies, though most of the
decreases are modest (less than negative 5%). The poorest
maximizers can lose the benefit of the tax bracket effect
entirely. For example, maximizers with 403(b) and 401(k)
plans at income levels of $10,000 to $20,000 actually receive
negative subsidies. Their increased contributions eliminate
most or all of their taxable income during employment, but
they face large tax bills on substantial plan distributions
later. Again, a longer distribution schedule might eliminate
or diminish the size of these negative subsidies.
5% -

Figure 6:
Changes in Maximizers' Average Subsidy Rate
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D. MarginalSubsidy Rates
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate another relative measure of
subsidies available through participation in the private
pension system. The vertical axis in both figures indicates
the additional, or marginal, subsidy a maximizer could
obtain by contributing (if possible) one additional dollar to a
plan. As was the case with the previous analyses, it is
important to remember that these calculations illustrate
the different tax subsidies for savings available to two
identical individuals, one who saves through the private
pension system and receives its special tax subsidies and
one who saves through more conventional means, such as a
brokerage or savings account, and pays taxes on those
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savings every year under standard tax rules. The figures
indicate how much of a tax subsidy the individuals in each
plan at each income level receive as compared to their twins
for saving just one additional dollar.
1. Before Reform. Figure 7 tells a story similar to that
of Figure 6. Maximizers with IRAs receive the most
generous marginal subsidies, while those with MPPs
generally receive the least generous. For example, a
maximizer with an IRA at the $150,000 to $160,000 income
level receives the most generous subsidy, 53%, or fifty-three
cents per additional dollar of saving. Richer maximizers
generally receive higher marginal subsidies than poorer
maximizers. Maximizers with all plans (except IRAs) at
income levels above $160,000 receive between twenty-five
to forty cents in tax subsidy for each additional dollar
saved; those at income levels between $50,000 and $100,000
receive between fifteen and twenty-five cents per additional
dollar.
Figure 7:
Maximizer's Marginal Subsidy Rate
Before Reform

60%o
50%

30%

-A

20%

-.-

SEP
PP
457

- 403b

10%

-401k

0%
-10%

IRA

s

40%

4'0

so

120

160

200

240

Initial Income (in Thousands)

Figure 7 reveals that even under current law, some of
the poorest maximizers receive negative subsidies.
Maximizers with all plans but SEPs and IRAs at income
levels between $20,000 and $40,000 receive marginal
subsidies of between negative 2% and negative 4%. This
means that they pay an extra two to four cents in tax for
each additional dollar saved. Contributions by these
maximizers are most often affected by the 25%-of-
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compensation limit, suggesting that the limits at these
income levels may already be too generous. These
maximizers would do better, from a tax perspective, not to
save through the private pension system. Lengthening the
distribution schedule might make these negative subsidies
disappear but it is unlikely to substantially increase them.
2. Reform Results. Figure 8 illustrates that the reform
proposals have no effect (or only a modest negative effect)
on the marginal subsidies of most maximizers. Yet, the
poorest maximizers are the ones most adversely affected.
Maximizers with initial incomes between $10,000 and
$40,000 with all plans but IRAs and SEPs now receive a
negative subsidy under the reform proposals. In most cases,
the negative subsidy is modest. However, this is not true for
maximizers with initial incomes of $10,000 with 403(b)s
and 401(k)s. Under current law, they receive marginal
subsidies of eight and six cents on the dollar, respectively.
Under the reform proposals, they receive a subsidy of more
than negative 100%, which translates into more than one
additional dollar in taxes for every additional dollar saved.
Figure 8:
Changes in Maximizers' Marginal Subsidy
Rates Due to Reform

20%

0%

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-20%

4----

IRA
SEP

-40%
--

-60%
-80%

-

MPP
457
403b

[-4--401k
-100%
-120%
Initial Income (in Thousands)

This result is obtained because the former 25%-ofcontribution limit no longer applies under the reform
proposals, enabling these individuals to save 100% of their
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incomes. Under current law, these maximizers contribute
about $80,000 over their lifetimes. Under the reform
proposals they are able (theoretically at least) to contribute
an additional $250,000. The tax effect of these changes is
that under current law these maximizers pay little or no
tax on their incomes while they work and little or no tax on
their savings in retirement. Under the reform proposals,
they also pay no tax on their incomes while they work but
they pay tax at a high rate on their savings in retirement
because they have accumulated such substantial amounts
that their yearly distributions put them in the highest tax
brackets.
These results indicate that the reform proposals really
do not benefit low income maximizers. Their incomes are
too small to receive any substantial benefit from the tax
subsidies enjoyed by higher-income individuals through the
private pension system. Enabling them to save more only
worsens their tax position. This analysis illustrates that
maximizers who receive negative subsidies would be better
off not taking advantage of these higher contribution limits.
They should instead emulate their twins and increase their
savings outside the private pension system.
III. CASE Two: STEADY SAVERS
Obviously, few people wish to save, or are even capable
of saving, the maximum amount permitted under the
private pension system each year. Most people save far less
than do maximizers. This section of the article analyzes a
more plausible and reasonable savings profile. It examines
the experience of steady savers, those who contribute 5% of
their earnings to a plan annually.
A. Contributions
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the total contributions made
to each plan by age sixty-five. Again, dollar amounts on the
vertical axis are expressed in 2001 dollars, contributions
are calculated for the thirty year period between ages
thirty-five and sixty-five, and the horizontal axis indicates
compensation in the first year of savings (age thirty-five).
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1. Before Reform. Figure 9 indicates a generally
positive and linear relationship between income levels and
contributions among steady savers. In addition, there is
little variation across the plans. At income levels under
$160,000, steady savers with all plans except IRAs
contribute the same amount. The special nondiscrimination
rules that apply to 401(k) plans, often reducing
contributions by those earning between $80,000 and
$120,000, have no effect on steady savers. Steady savers
with 401(k) plans at these income levels contribute just as
much as their peers. Steady savers with IRAs and incomes
at or over $40,000, however, contribute the same amount.
At those income levels, steady savers become maximizers as
the contribution limit takes effect.
Figure 9:
Steady Savers' Lifetime Savings
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At about $160,000 in income, the remaining plans begin
to diverge as the specific limits applicable to 457s, 403(b)s,
and 401(k)s start to take effect. Steady savers with 457
plans reach plan limits at an income of about $150,000 a
year because 5% of this level of compensation is $7500,
about the annual dollar limit under 457 plans. Steady
savers with 403(b) and 401(k) plans do not reach plan limits
until about $200,000 in income, at which point the annual
dollar limit of about $10,000 begins to take effect. Steady
savers with MPPs or SEPs, even at about $240,000 a year,
never reach maximum plan limits.
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Because of this relative uniformity across plan types,
the maximum contributions by age sixty-five are very
similar for each plan. Steady savers with SEPs and MPPs
contribute about $400,000 (about $200,000 in present value
terms), those with 403(b)s and 401(k)s contribute about
$330,000 (about $160,000 in present value terms) and those
with 457s contribute about $260,000 (about $130,000 in
present value terms). When earnings are taken into
account, steady savers arrive at retirement with maximum
account accumulations of about $1 million (SEPs and
MPPs), $850,000 (403[b] plans), $820,000 (401[k] plans),
and $670,000 (457 plans). Steady savers with IRAs arrive
at retirement exactly as did maximizers with IRAs-with
about $44,000 in maximum contributions and account
accumulations of $125,000.
Figure 10:
Changes in Steady Savers' Lifetime Savings
Due to Reform
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2. Reform Results. Figure 10 indicates that the reform
proposals benefit only steady savers at the highest income
levels with 457, 403(b) and 401(k) plans, largely because of
the increase in the flat dollar limit that becomes available
to more steady savers. Steady savers with 457 plans are the
largest beneficiaries of these changes, contributing close to
an additional $20,000 at $160,00 in initial income and an
additional $130,000 at $240,000 in initial income. When
earnings are taken into account, the effect of these changes
is that steady savers with 457 and 403(b) plans have about
the same maximum account accumulation of close to $1
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million, as do steady savers with SEPs and MPPs; those
with 401(k) plans have over $900,000.
Figure 11:
Steady Savers' Total Real Subsidy
Before Reform
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B. Total Real Subsidies
Figure 11 indicates the total dollars received by steady
savers as a tax subsidy under current law, and Figure 12
indicates how the reform proposals affect those amounts.
1. Before Reform. Figure 11 also indicates a generally
linear, positive relationship between dollar subsidies and
income levels through about $150,000 in initial income.
This reflects the fact, previously seen in Figure 9, that
steady savers have uniform contributions across plans
within these income intervals. Subsidies for steady savers
with 457, 403(b), and 401(k) plans increase linearly until
they reach their unique plan limits, when both
contributions and dollar subsidies begin to taper off.
Contribution limits never affect steady savers with SEPs or
MPPs. Steady savers with IRAs, as always, are the
exception. At the three lowest income levels, they receive
dollar subsidies similar to those of other plans, but they
start falling behind at $40,000 in initial income.
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2. Reform Results. The reform proposals affect only
those steady savers at higher income levels (above
$160,000) and only those with 457, 403(b), and 401(k)
plans, as indicated in Figure 12. Steady savers at the
highest income level receive about an additional $70,000 in
subsidies if they have a 457 plan, $30,000 if they have a
403(b) plan, and $25,000 if they have an IRA.
Figure 12:
Changes in Steady Savers' Total Real Subsidy
Due to Reform
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C. Average Subsidy Rates
Figure 13 illustrates the average subsidy rates received
by steady savers under current law, and Figure 14 indicates
how the reform proposals affect those rates.
1. Before Reform. The average subsidy rates received
by steady savers are not very different from those received
by maximizers. Again, steady savers with IRAs generally
receive the highest subsidy rates, and subsidy rates rise
with income levels. Steady savers with IRAs and income
levels between $140,000 and $190,000 receive the greatest
subsidy, fifty-three cents on the dollar. The other steady
savers show the same pattern of average subsidy but
receive subsidy rates of about 10% less, depending on
income level. In addition, when average subsidy rates are
tested in a world without tax brackets, steady savers'
average subsidy rates are identical to those received by
maximizers across plan types and income levels. The only

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

900

[Vol. 49

real difference is that steady savers do not show the
variability in rate by plan type that maximizers do. Steady
savers with all plans other than IRAs receive the same
average subsidy rate at the same income level.
Figure 13:
Current Law, Average Subsidy Rate, Steady Savers
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Figure 14: Average Subsidy Rate, Steady Savers, Effect of Proposed Reforms
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2. Reform Results. The reform proposals affect only
those steady savers at the highest income levels and only
those with 457, 403(b), and 401(k) plans. Figure 14
indicates some decrease in average subsidy rates among
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steady savers in those plans with incomes above $170,000,
but the decreases are quite modest (3% or less).
D. MarginalSubsidy Rates
Figure 15 illustrates the additional, or marginal,
subsidy a steady saver could obtain by contributing one
additional dollar of savings to a plan under current law in
comparison to his or her twin who saves outside the private
pension system. Figure 16 indicates the effect of the reform
proposals on the marginal subsidies received by steady
savers.
Figure 15:
CurrentLaw, Marginal Subsidy Rate, Steady Savers
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1. Before Reform. Although steady savers exhibit the
same general trend in marginal subsidy rates as
maximizers, there is at least one important difference: As
Figure 15 illustrates, there are no negative marginal
subsidy rates. This means that all steady savers, including
those at the lowest income levels, receive some tax benefit
from saving through the private pension system. In
addition, the marginal subsidy is almost identical across all
plans at each income level (steady savers with IRAs are the
exception). At incomes over $170,000, there is some
divergence, as the marginal subsidy rate for steady savers
with 457 plans remains essentially flat while all others
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begin to decrease. Steady savers with IRAs exhibit the
same pattern as the other plans, but in all income levels
above $30,000 they receive a 6% to 14% greater marginal
subsidy. But, as was true of maximizers, wealthier steady
savers generally receive greater marginal subsidy rates
than poorer steady savers. For example, most steady savers
with incomes above $140,000 receive about thirty to fifty
cents in subsidy for each additional dollar saved, while
those with incomes between $30,000 and $100,000 receive
twenty to thirty cents in subsidy. In contrast, steady savers
with incomes below $20,000 receive marginal subsidies of
about ten to fifteen cents.
2. Reform Results. As was the case with the other
subsidies, the reform proposals have no significant effect on
the marginal subsidies received by steady savers. Only
steady savers with 457 plans and incomes over $170,000
experience any change; in their case, it is a negative but
very modest change (between negative 1% and negative
4%).
Figure 16:
Marginal Subsidy Rate, Steady Savers, Effect of Proposed Reforms
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CONCLUSIONS

Although this study tested the effects of the reform
proposals on a very simple model of saving through the
private pension system, its results suggest several findings
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that can be more broadly applied. First, the reform
proposals will primarily benefit those individuals who wish
to and are capable of saving a large portion of their
incomes. On their face, the proposals also appear to benefit
low-income savers by lifting the 25%-of-compensation limit,
which is the most important restriction on their
contributions in several plans today. However, most lowincome savers cannot afford to take advantage of the
increased limits offered by the reform proposals. Even if
they could, many would be better off from a tax perspective
saving outside rather than inside the pension system. The
current limits comfortably accommodate reasonable,
plausible rates of saving for both low and higher income
individuals today. Second, the reform proposals will not
increase the average or marginal tax subsidies for savings
obtainable through the private pension system. In fact, they
may very well decrease those subsidies, particularly for
individuals at the lowest income levels, but only for those
who save more than they could have saved before. Third,
the reform proposals will increase the absolute amount of
dollars received in tax subsidies. This means that the
magnitude of federal tax dollars devoted to the private
pension system will increase but that the pattern of
distribution of those dollars across income groups will
largely remain the same.
The proposals help those who would like and can afford
to save more for retirement. They do little to provide
additional incentive to those who can afford to save more
but do not. They also provide no additional incentives to
those who can afford to save only a little or nothing at all.
Much political capital has already been expended on these
proposals, and more will be necessary to make them law.
From a political cost-benefit perspective, it is reasonable to
ask whether they are worth the expense. These proposals
do not attempt to make fundamental changes in the
structure or operation of the system, both of which are
needed to reform the private pension system. 2
The private pension system should be made more
effective for those who are left out or left behind by the
current system. Low-income savers are often left out of a
12. For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see PAMELA PERUN &
EUGENE STEUERLE, URBAN INSTITUTE, ERISA AT 50: A NEW MODEL FOR THE

PENSION SYSTEM 1-10 (2000).
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pension system that is based solely on tax system
incentives and subsidies. They do not earn enough and
cannot contribute enough to receive much benefit from the
incentives and subsidies in place today. It is extremely
unlikely that they would or could increase their savings to
take advantage of the reform proposal increases. This study
suggests that they might be better off saving through more
conventional means than through the private pension
system. Helping low-income savers is difficult and may
require some federal assistance in the form of matching
contributions.13 But this is certainly a more worthy effort
than providing additional federal tax dollars to help those
who can already save a large amount.
IRAs are also in need of reform. Employees who have no
employer plan, even for their own savings, have certainly
been left behind in the current system. A modest increase
in IRA contribution limits seems easier to justify that the
large increases in other plans found in the reform
proposals. Yet there is some resistance to raising IRA
contribution limits. The theory is that employers,
particularly small ones, who can make substantial
contributions to IRAs for themselves will be less inclined to
sponsor a qualified plan where they must make
contributions for their employees. But today's low IRA
limits have not solved the problem of employer plan
sponsorship. This is a complicated issue that needs to be
addressed. In the meantime, these employees deserve
greater access to the tax benefits of the private pension
system.
The primary issue for policymakers is the current
pension system's many different savings plans and rules.
Although the reform proposals help make plans more
consistent, they do not attempt the long-overdue step of
rationalizing the employee savings system. It no longer
makes sense for employee savings plans to be subject to
different rules based upon the tax attributes of the
employer. For example, even though the reform proposals
standardize contribution rules, the plans will continue to
differ in important respects. Currently, they differ in their
ability to offer loans, hardship distributions, and rollovers
to IRAs, as well as in the standards of fiduciary
13. PAMELA PERUN, MATCHING PRIVATE SAVING WITH FEDERAL DOLLARS: USA

AccouNTs AND OTHER SUBSIDIES FOR SAVING (1999).
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responsibility imposed on those who handle and invest
contributions by employees. These differences add to the
administrative burden of a plan, and standardizing these
rules could encourage more employers to provide plans for
their employees. Other differences have even greater
consequences. Most employers now require their employees
to take more responsibility for their own retirement
savings. Providing plans that promote participation by lowincome workers is critical. If the evidence indicates that the
nondiscrimination rules for 401(k)s are effective in getting
low-income workers to save, it might be worthwhile to
extend those rules to all employee savings plans, even at
the cost of more legal and administrative complexity.
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Appendix
HISTORY

& DESCRIPTION

OF SAVINGS PLANS

A. Savings Plansfor Employees
Savings plans for employees, a relatively new addition
to the private pension system, permit employees to decide
how much to save for retirement each year within tax code
limits and, usually, how those savings will be invested.
Employers often provide matching contributions (not taken
into account in this analysis) to 401(k) plans to encourage
more savings by low-paid employees.
401(k) Plans
The most popular employee savings plans are 401(k)s.
For technical legal reasons, a 401(k) plan must be part of a
larger defined contribution plan, either a stock bonus plan
or profit-sharing plan. They are qualified plans, belonging
to the largest and oldest family of plans satisfying the
requirements of I.R.C. § 401(a). The tax code has provided
favorable tax treatment for such plans since the 1920s.
Formally created in 1978, 401(k) plans became widely used
only in the early 1980s after the resolution of various legal
issues. They are typically sponsored by for-profit employers.
Since 1997, tax-exempt employers have once again been
able to sponsor such plans, but few do because 403(b) plans
are so much simpler. Government employers may not
sponsor 401(k) plans, which are very difficult to administer
because they are subject to complicated annual testing
procedures designed to ensure that highly paid employees
do not contribute significantly more than low-paid
employees. In addition, 401(k) plans are subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
and must comply with its reporting, disclosure, prohibitedtransaction, and fiduciary liability requirements.
403(b) Plans
Only tax-exempt charities; educational, scientific, or
similar entities organized under I.R.C. §501(c)(3); or public
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schools may offer 403(b) plans, often called tax-deferred or
tax-sheltered annuities. Tax-sheltered annuities were
initially authorized under I.R.C. § 403 in 1942, and 403(b)
arrangements for employee contributions became available
in 1958. These are not qualified plans, since they are not
regulated by I.R.C. § 401(a), but they receive essentially the
same tax treatment. If the 403(b) plan is structured without
employer contributions, as is the case in this analysis, it is
not subject to ERISA. In addition, the employees, not the
plan or the employer, are responsible for ensuring their own
compliance with the tax code limits.
457 Plans
The 457 plan, primarily sponsored by state and local
government employers, was enacted in 1978 under I.R.C. §
457 as part of an effort to set more uniform standards for
employee savings arrangements. These plans are part of a
family of plans known as nonqualified deferred
compensation plans. They also are not qualified plans, but
they have similar tax benefits to qualified plans. They are
not subject to ERISA.
IRAs
IRAs were created in 1974 under I.R.C. § 408.
Employees without an employer-sponsored plan or with
incomes below certain limits may make tax-deductible
contributions to a traditional IRA. Others may make aftertax contributions to a traditional IRA or the new Roth IRA.
Contributions to all IRAs by a single individual are subject
to a $2,000 annual limit. Under a traditional IRA-but not
a Roth IRA-benefits attributable to tax-deductible
contributions, earnings, and earnings on after-tax
contributions are taxable when received. IRAs are not
usually subject to ERISA, and contributors are responsible
for complying with savings limits.
B. Savings Plansfor the Self-Employed
Since 1962, the tax code has permitted self-employed
individuals (such as unincorporated businesses, sole
proprietorships, and farmers) to sponsor retirement plans.
Until the early 1980s, these plans were subject to tighter
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limits on contributions and benefits and more restrictive
provisions than corporate retirement plans. Self-employed
individuals are treated as "employers," even if they have no
employees, so that they can choose from among the many
different types of plans available. Their decision about how
much to contribute each year on their own behalf is the
functional equivalent of an employee's decision in a 401(k)type plan. Most choose one of the qualified defined
contribution plans described below.
Money PurchasePensionPlans (MPPs)
A money purchase plan is a qualified defined
contribution plan that permits larger contributions than a
profit-sharing plan, its primary alternative. Employers
contribute to MPPs annually, according to a fixed
contribution formula, while contributions to a profit-sharing
plan are discretionary. Because they cover only selfemployed people and their spouses, MPPs are not subject to
ERISA.
Simplified Employee PensionPlans (SEPs)
A self-employed person can also choose an IRA-based
SEP, created in 1978 under I.R.C. § 408(k). These plans are
easier to administer than qualified plans. Their
contribution and deduction limits are similar to those of
qualified profit-sharing plans. SEPs are not subject to
ERISA if the only participants are self-employed people and
their spouses.

